We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous first-price auctions (FPAs) for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian price of anarchy (BPoA) of these auctions are e/(e − 1) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and 2 [Feldman et al. 2013] , respectively. We provide matching lower bounds for both cases even for the case of full information and for mixed Nash equilibria via an explicit construction. We present an alternative proof of the upper bound of e/(e − 1) for FPAs with fractionally subadditive valuations that reveals the worst-case price distribution, which is used as a building block for the matching lower bound construction.
INTRODUCTION
Combinatorial auctions constitute a fundamental, well-studied resource allocation problem that involves the interaction of n selfish agents in competition for m indivisible resources/goods. The preferences of each player for different bundles of the items are expressed via a valuation set function (one per player). The main challenge Item bidding. Of particular interest are the so-called combinatorial auctions with item-bidding, from both practical and theoretical aspects. In such an auction, the auctioneer sells each item by running simultaneously m independent single-item auctions. Depending on the type of single-item auctions used, the two main variants that have been studied are simultaneous SPAs [Christodoulou et al. 2008; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Feldman et al. 2013 ] and simultaneous first-price auctions (FPAs) [Hassidim et al. 2011; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; Feldman et al. 2013] . In both cases, the bidders are asked to submit a bid for each item. Then each item is assigned to the highest bidder. The main difference is that in the former, a winner is charged an amount equal to the second highest bid, whereas in the latter, a winner pays his own bid.
FPAs have been shown to be more efficient than SPAs. For general valuations, Hassidim et al. [2011] showed that pure equilibria of FPAs are efficient whenever they exist, but mixed and Bayesian Nash equilibria of FPAs can be highly inefficient in settings with complementarities. For two important classes of valuation functions, namely fractionally subadditive and subadditive, 2 for mixed and Bayesian Nash equilibria, Hassidim et al. [2011] , Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] , and Feldman et al. [2013] showed that FPAs have lower (constant) PoA than the respective bounds obtained for SPAs [Christodoulou et al. 2008; Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Feldman et al. 2013 ]. The current best upper bounds for the PoA in FPA are e/(e − 1) for XOS valuations [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] and 2 for subadditive valuations [Feldman et al. 2013] (proven by different techniques).
Our contribution. Following the work of Hassidim et al. [2011] , Feldman et al. [2013] , and Syrgkanis and Tardis [2013] , we study the PoA of FPAs for games with complete and incomplete information. Our main concern is the development of tools that provide tight bounds for the PoA of these auctions. Our results complement the current knowledge about simultaneous FPAs. We provide matching lower bounds to the upper bounds by Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] and Feldman et al. [2013] , showing that even for the case of full information and mixed Nash equilibria, the PoA is at least Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First-Price Auctions 9:3 e/(e − 1) for submodular 3 valuations (and therefore for XOS) and 2 for subadditive valuations. 4 We present an alternative proof of the upper bound of e/(e − 1) for FPAs with fractionally subadditive valuations. This bound was shown before in Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] using a general smoothness framework. Our approach does not adhere to their framework. A nice thing with our approach is that it reveals the worst-case price distribution, which we then use as a building block for the matching lower bound construction. An immediate consequence of our results is that the PoA of these auctions stays the same for mixed, correlated, coarse-correlated, and Bayesian Nash equilibria. Only for pure Nash equilibria is it equal to 1. Our findings suggest that smoothness may provide tight results for certain classes of auctions, using as a base class the class of mixed Nash equilibria and not that of pure equilibria. This is in contrast to what is known for routing games, where the respective base class was the class of pure equilibria.
For buyers with additive valuations (or for the single-item auction), we show that any mixed Nash equilibrium is efficient in contrast to Bayesian Nash equilibria that were previously known not to be always efficient [Krishna 2002 ]. This suggests an interesting separation between the full and the incomplete information cases as opposed to other valuation functions (e.g., submodular and subadditive) and other auction formats such as all-pay auctions (APAs) due to Baye et al. [1996] . Then we generalize our results to a class of item bidding auctions that we call bid-dependent auctions. Intuitively, a single-item auction is bid dependent if the winner is always the highest bidder, and a bidder's payment depends only on his own bid. Note that both winner and losers may have to pay. Apart from the FPA (where the losers pay 0), another notable item-bidding auction that falls into this class is the simultaneous all-pay (first-price) auction (APA) [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] , in which all bidders (even the losers) are charged for their bids. For subadditive valuations, we show that the PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions is exactly 2 by showing tight upper and lower bounds. We show that the upper bound technique due to Feldman et al. [2013] for FPAs can be applied to all mechanisms of this class. Interestingly, although one might expect that FPAs perform strictly better than APAs, our results suggest that all simultaneous bid-dependent auctions perform equally well. We note that our upper bound for subadditive valuations extends the previously known upper bound of 2 for APAs that was only known for XOS valuations [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] .
Finally, we apply our techniques on discriminatory price multiunit auctions [Krishna 2002 ]. We complement the results by de Keijzer et al. [2013] for the case of subadditive valuations by providing a matching lower bound of 2 for the standard bidding format. For the case of submodular valuations, we were able to provide a lower bound of 1.109. We were also able to reproduce their upper bound of e/(e − 1) for submodular bids using our nonsmooth approach. Note that the previous lower bound for such auctions was 1.0004 [de Keijzer et al. 2013] for Bayesian Nash equilibria. Both of our lower bounds hold for the case of mixed Nash equilibria.
Related work. A long line of research aims to design simple auctions with good performance guarantee (e.g., see Hartline and Roughgarden [2009] and Chawla et al. [2010] ). The (in)efficiency of first-price price auctions has been observed in economics (compare to Krishna [2002] ) starting from the seminal work by Vickrey [1961] . Bikhchandani [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] In the first column, the first argument refers to the valuation class and the second argument to the related equilibrium concept. SA and SM stand for subadditive and submodular valuations, respectively, and where 'M-B' appears the bounds hold for mixed, correlated, coarse-correlated, or Bayesian Nash equilibria.
[1999] was the first who studied the simultaneous sealed bid auctions in full information settings and observed the inefficiency of their equilibria. Christodoulou et al. [2008] extended the concept of PoA to the Bayesian setting and applied it to item-bidding auctions. Bikhchandani [1999] and then Hassidim et al. [2011] showed that in case of general valuations, pure Nash equilibria are always efficient (whenever they exist) in FPAs, whereas Fu et al. [2012] proved that the PoA is at most 2 for SPAs. For Bayesian Nash equilibria, Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] and Feldman et al. [2013] showed improved upper bounds on the Bayesian price of anarchy (BPoA) for FPAs. Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] came up with a general composability framework of smooth mechanisms that proved to be quite useful, as it led to upper bounds for several settings, such as FPAs, APAs, and multiunit auctions.
Only a few lower bound results are known for the PoA of simultaneous auctions. For valuations that include complementarities, Hassidim et al. [2011] presented an example with PoA = ( √ m) for FPA; as suggested in Feldman et al. [2013] , a similar lower bound can be derived for SPAs as well. Under the nonoverbidding assumption, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] gave a lower bound of 2.013 for SPAs with subadditive bidders and (n 1/4 ) for correlated bidders. In Feldman et al. [2013] , similar results are shown under the weak nonoverbidding assumption. We summarize the PoA results for FPAs in Table I. Very recently and independently, Roughgarden [2014] presented a very elegant methodology to provide PoA lower bounds via a reduction from communication or computational complexity lower bounds for the underlying optimization problem. One consequence of his reduction is a general lower bound of 2 and e/(e − 1) for the PoA of any simple auction (including item-bidding auctions) with subadditive and fractionally subadditive bidders, respectively. Therefore, there is an overlap with our results for these two classes of valuations. We show these lower bounds via an explicit construction for FPAs (and also for bid-dependent auctions).
We emphasize that these two approaches are incomparable in the following sense. On the one hand, the results in Roughgarden [2014] hold for more general formats of combinatorial auctions than the ones we study here. On the other hand, our e/(e − 1) lower bound holds even for more special valuation functions where the results of Roughgarden [2014] results are either weaker (2e/(2e−1) for submodular valuations) or not applicable. For the case of submodular valuations, Feige and Vondrák [2010] showed that a strictly higher than 1−1/e amount of the optimum social welfare can be obtained in polynomial communication; for gross substitute valuations (and therefore for its subclass, OXS valuations), Nisan and Segal [2006] showed that exact efficiency can be obtained in polynomial communication. These two results show that the technique of Roughgarden [2014] does not provide tight lower bounds for the settings studied in this article. We also note that the PoA lower bound obtained by the reduction of Roughgarden [2014] can only be applied to approximate Nash equilibria, whereas our results apply to exact Nash equilibria. Further, our PoA lower bound proof for subadditive valuations uses a simpler construction than the proof in Roughgarden [2014] , and it holds even for the case of only two bidders and identical items (multiunit auction). Finally, it should be stressed that none of our lower bounds for multiunit auctions can be derived from Roughgarden [2014] . Markakis and Telelis [2012] studied uniform price multiunit auctions. de Keijzer et al. [2013] bounded the BPoA for several formats of multiunit auctions with first-or second-price rules. Auctions employing greedy algorithms were studied by Lucier and Borodin [2010] . A number of works [Paes Leme and Tardos 2010; Caragiannis et al. 2011; Roughgarden 2012 ] studied the PoA of generalized SPAs in the full information and Bayesian settings and even with correlated bidders [Lucier and Paes Leme 2011] . Chawla and Hartline [2013] proved that for the generalized FPAs with symmetric bidders, the pure Bayesian Nash equilibria are unique and always efficient.
Organization of the article. We introduce the necessary background and notation in Section 2. We then present the tight bounds for FPAs with fractionally subadditive, subadditive, and additive valuations in Sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we show how our results can be generalized to a class of auctions that we call bid dependent. Finally, we apply our techniques to get bounds on the PoA of discriminatory multiunit auctions in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
Simultaneous FPAs constitute a simple type of combinatorial auctions. In a combinatorial auction with n players (or bidders) and m items, every player i ∈ [n] has a valuation for each subset of items, given by a valuation function v i : 2 [m] 
The v i functions are monotone and normalized-that is,
and v i (∅) = 0. We use the short notation v i ( j) = v i ({ j}).
In the Bayesian setting, the valuation of each player i is drawn from V i according to some known distribution D i . We assume that the D i are independent (and possibly different) over the players. In the full information setting, the valuation v i is fixed and known by all other players for all i ∈ [n]. Note that the latter is a special Bayesian combinatorial auction, in which player i has valuation v i with probability 1.
An allocation X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) is a partition of the items (allowing empty sets X i ), so each item is assigned to exactly one player. The most common global objective in combinatorial auctions is to maximize the sum of the valuations of the players for their received sets of items-that is, to maximize the social welfare SW(X) of the allocation, where SW(X) = i∈ [n] 
In a simultaneous (or item bidding) auction, every player i ∈ [n] submits a nonnegative bid b ij for each item j ∈ [m]. The items are then allocated by independent auctions: for each j ∈ [m], the bidder i with the highest bid b ij receives the item. We consider the case when the payment for each item is the first-price payment: a player pays his own bid (the highest bid) for every item he receives. Our (upper bound) results hold for arbitrary randomized tie-breaking rules. Note that with such a rule, for any fixed b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), the probabilities for the players to get a particular item are fixed.
For a given bid vector b i , item j ∈ [m], and a subset of items S ⊆ [m], we use the notation b i (S) = j∈S b ij , and b i ( j) = b ij . Assume that the players submitted bids for the items according to b i = (b i1 , . . . , b im ) and the simultaneous FPA yields the allocation X(b). For simplicity, we use v i (b) and SW(b) instead of v i (X i (b)) and SW(X(b)) to express the valuation of player i and the social welfare for the allocation X(b) if X is clear from the context. The utility u i of player i is defined as his valuation for the received set, minus his payments:
Bidding Strategies, Nash Equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy
A pure (bidding) strategy b i for player i is a vector of bids for the m items b i = (b i1 , . . . , b im ). As usual, b −i denotes the strategies of all players except for i. The pure strategy profile of all bidders is then b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ).
A mixed strategy B i of player i is a probability distribution over pure strategies. Let B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) be a profile of mixed strategies. Given a profile B, we fix the notation for the following cumulative distribution functions (CDF): unless defined otherwise, G ij is the CDF of the bid of player i for item j, F j is the CDF of the highest bid for item j in b, and F ij is the CDF of the highest bid for item j in b −i . Observe that F j = k G kj and F ij = k =i G kj . We also use ϕ ij (x) to denote the probability that player i gets item j by bidding x. Then ϕ ij (x) ≤ F ij (x) due to a possible tie in x.
We review five standard equilibrium concepts studied in this article: pure, mixed, correlated, coarse-correlated, and Bayesian Nash equilibria. The first four of them are for the full information setting, and the last one is defined in the Bayesian setting. Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be the players' valuation functions. In the Bayesian setting, v i is drawn from V i according to some known distribution. Let B denote a distribution over bidding profiles b of the players. Then B is called a -pure Nash equilibrium if B is a pure strategy profile b and
where the given inequalities hold for all players i and (pure) deviating bids b i . It is well known that each one of the first four classes is contained in the next class (i.e., pure ⊆ mixed ⊆ correlated ⊆ coarse correlated). If we regard the full information setting as a special case of the Bayesian setting, we also have pure ⊆ mixed ⊆ Bayesian. For a given auction and fixed valuations v of the bidders, let O be an optimal allocation. Then for this auction (game), the PoA in pure equilibria is PoA = max b pure Nash SW(O) SW(b) ; Given a class of auctions, the PoA for this type of auction is the worst case of the preceding ratio over all auctions of the class, valuation profiles v, and bidding profile B. For the other four types of equilibria, the PoA can be defined analogously.
For the expected utility of a given bidder i, we often use the short notation
Types of Valuations
Our results concern different classes of valuation functions, which we define next, in increasing order of inclusion. Let v : 2 [m] → R ≥0 , be a valuation function. Then v is called
where the given equalities and inequalities must hold for arbitrary item sets S, T ⊆ [m]. It is well known that each one of the preceding classes is strictly contained in the next class-for example, an additive set function is always submodular but not vice versa, a submodular is always XOS, and so on [Feige 2006 ]. As an equivalent definition, submodular valuations are exactly the valuations with decreasing marginal values,
SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS
In this section, we present a lower bound of e e−1 for the mixed PoA in simultaneous FPAs with OXS and, therefore, submodular and fractionally subadditive valuations. This is a matching lower bound to the results of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] .
To the explain the key properties of the instance proving a tight lower bound, first we discuss a new approach to obtain the same upper bound for the PoA of a first-price single-item auction as in Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] . Although the upper bound that we derive with the help of this idea can also be obtained based on the very general smoothness framework [Roughgarden 2012; Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; de Keijzer et al. 2013] , the approach we introduce here does not adhere to this framework. 6 The strength of our approach consists of its potential to lead to better (in this case tight) lower bounds, as we demonstrate subsequently.
Price of Anarchy Upper Bound for Single-Item Auctions
THEOREM 3.1. The PoA of mixed Nash equilibria in first-price single-item auctions is at most e e−1 . PROOF. Let v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be the valuations of the players, and suppose that v i = max k∈[n] v k . We fix a mixed Nash equilibrium B = (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ). Let p i denote the highest bid in b −i , and let F(
The following lemma prepares the ground for the selection of an appropriate deviating bid.
LEMMA 3.2. For any pure strategy a of player i,
PROOF. If F is continuous in a, then F(a) = P[ p i ≤ a] = P[ p i < a], tie breaking in a does not matter, and F(a) also equals the probability that bidder i gets the item if he bids a. Therefore,
, then as a CDF, it is at least right continuous. By the previous argument, E[u i (b)] ≥ F(a + )(v i − a − ) holds for every x = a + where F is continuous, and the lemma follows by taking → 0.
Since in a Nash equilibrium the expected utility of every (other) player is nonnegative, by summing over all players, it holds that n k=1
. On the other hand, for any fixed bidding profile b, we have
Let b max be the maximum bid in b. By taking expectations with regard to 9:8 G. Christodoulou et al.
By combining this with Lemma 3.2, we obtain
for any (deviating) bid a. (Analogues of this derivation are standard in the simultaneous auctions literature.) We choose the bid a * that maximizes the right-hand side of (1)-for instance, a * = arg max a F(a)(v − a) (see Figure 1 (a) for an illustration). Then to upper bound the PoA, we look for the maximum value of λ, such that
The following lemma settles the maximum value of such λ as 1− 1 e for mixed equilibria. 7 This will complete the proof of the theorem, since by (1) and
. For any nonnegative random variable p with CDF F, and any fixed value
We use the fact that the expectation of a nonnegative random variable with CDF F can be calculated as
where the last inequality is due to the fact that Aln
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Worst-case price distribution. The CDF F(x) that makes all inequalities of (the proof of) Lemma 3.3 tight (see Figure 1 
)v]. The given distributionF for p i makes inequality (2) tight. To construct a (tight) lower bound for the PoA, we also need to tighten the inequalities in (1). Note that the inequality of Lemma 3.2 is tight for all a ∈ [0, (1 − 1 e )v]. Intuitively, we need to construct a Nash equilibrium, where the CDF of p i is equal toF(x) and b i does not exceed p i . We present a construction (with many items) in Section 3.2.
Remark 3.4. Here we discuss our technique and the smoothness technique that achieves the same upper bound [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] . In Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] , a particular mixed bidding strategy A 0 was defined for each player i such that for every price p
Moreover, we prove that the inequality is tight by providing the minimizing distributionF such that max a g(a,F) = v(1 − 1/e). By the minimax theorem, min F max a g(a, F) = max A min p g(A, p) = v(1 − 1/e). One advantage of our approach is that it can be coupled with a worst-case distributionF that serves as an optimality certificate of the method. Moreover, if one can convert F to a Nash equilibrium strategy profile (see Section 3.2), a tight Nash equilibrium construction is obtained; however, this can be a challenging task.
Tight Lower Bound
Here we present a tight lower bound of e e−1 for the mixed PoA in simultaneous FPAs with OXS valuations. This implies a lower bound for submodular and fractionally subadditive valuations.
THEOREM 3.5. The PoA of simultaneous FPAs with full information and OXS valuations is at least e e−1 ≈ 1.58. PROOF. We construct an instance with n+ 1 players and n n items. We define the set of items as M = [n] n -that is, they correspond to all different vectors w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) with w i ∈ [n] (where [n] denotes the set of integers {1, . . . , n}). Intuitively, they can be thought of as the nodes of an n dimensional grid, with coordinates in [n] in each dimension.
We call player 0 the dummy player and all other players i ∈ [n] real players. We associate each real player i with one of the dimensions (directions) of the grid. In particular, for any fixed player i, his valuation for a subset of items S ⊆ M is the size (number of elements) in the n − 1-dimensional projection of S in direction i. Formally,
It is straightforward to check that v i has decreasing marginal values and is therefore submodular. 8 The dummy player 0 has valuation 0 for any subset of items. 8 These valuations are also OXS. In the definition of OXS valuations (Section 2), we set k = n n−1 , and for the unit-demand valuations corresponding to player i, the following holds: if item j corresponds to w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ), then for r ∈ [k], v r i ( j) = 1, if w −i is the n-ary representation of r and v r i ( j) = 0, otherwise. 9:10 G. Christodoulou et al. Fig. 2 . The figure illustrates the cases n = 2 and n = 3 ((a) and (b), respectively) for the lower bound example with submodular valuation functions. In (c), an optimal allocation for case n = 3 is shown.
Given these valuations, we describe a mixed Nash equilibrium B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) having a PoA arbitrarily close to e/(e − 1), for large enough n. The dummy player bids 0 for every item and receives the item if all real players bid 0 for it. The utility and welfare of the dummy player is always 0. For real players, the mixed strategy B i is as follows. Every player i picks a number ∈ [n] uniformly at random and an x according to the distribution with CDF
. Subsequently, he bids x for every item w = ( , w −i ), with w i = as i th coordinate, and bids 0 for the rest of the items (Figure 2 shows cases for n = 2 and n = 3) In other words, in any b i in the support of B i , the player bids a positive x only for an n− 1 dimensional slice of the items. Observe that G(·) has no mass points, so tie breaking matters only in case of 0 bids for an item, in which case player 0 gets the item.
Let F(x) denote the probability that bidder i gets a fixed item j, given that he bids b i ( j) = x for this item, and the bids in b −i are drawn from B −i (due to symmetry, this probability is the same for all items w = ( , w −i )). For every other player k, the probability that he bids 0 for item j is (n − 1)/n, and the probability that j is in his selected slice but he bids lower than x is G(x)/n. Multiplying over the n − 1 other players, we obtain
Notice that v i is an additive valuation restricted to the slice of items that player i bids for in a particular b i . Therefore, when player i bids
for one of these items, and comprising all items, it is
Next we show that B is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, the bids b i in the support of B i maximize the expected utility of a fixed player i.
First, we fix an arbitrary w −i and focus on the set of items C := {( , w −i ) | ∈ [n]}, which we call a column for player i. Recall that i is interested in getting only one item within C, whereas his valuation is additive over items from different columns. Moreover, in a fixed b −i , every other player k submits the same bid for all items in C, because either the whole C is in the current slice of k and he bids the same value x, or no item from the column is in the slice and he bids 0. Consider first a deviating bid, in which i bids a positive value for more than one items in C, say (at least) the values x ≥ x > 0, where x is his highest bid in C. Then his expected utility for this column is strictly less than F(x)(1 − x), because his value is F(x) · 1, but he might have to pay x + x , in case he gets both items. Consequently, bidding x for only one item in C and 0 for the rest of C is more profitable.
Second, observe that restricted to a fixed column, submitting any bid x ∈ [0, 1 − ( n−1 n ) n−1 ] for one arbitrary item results in the constant expected utility of ( n−1 n ) n−1 , whereas a bid higher than 1−( n−1 n ) n−1 guarantees the item but pays more, so the utility becomes strictly less than ( n−1 n ) n−1 for this column. In summary, bidding for exactly one item from each column, an arbitrary (possibly different) bid x ∈ [0, 1 − ( n−1 n ) n−1 ] is a best response for i yielding the preceding expected utility, which concludes the proof that B is a Nash equilibrium.
It remains to calculate the expected social welfare of B and the optimal social welfare. We define a random variable with respect to the distribution B. Let Z j = 1 if one of the real players 1, . . . , n gets item j, and let Z j = 0 if player 0 gets the item. Note that the social welfare is the random variable j∈M Z j , and the expected social welfare is
Finally, we show that the optimum social welfare is n n . An optimal allocation can be constructed as follows. For each item (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ), compute r = ( n i=1 w i mod n). Allocate this item to the player r + 1. It is easy to see that this way the n items of any particular column {( , w −k ) | ∈ [n]} (in any direction k) are given to the n different players and that each player is allocated n n−1 items (Figure 2 (c) shows the optimum allocation for n = 3). In other words, any two items allocated to the same player differ in at least two coordinates. In particular, they belong to different columns of this player, and all contribute 1 to the valuation of the player, which is therefore n n−1 . Since this valuation is the maximum possible for every player, the obtained social welfare of n n is optimal.
Thus, the PoA is 1 (1−( n−1 n ) n ) , and for large n, it converges to 1 (1− 1 e ) ≈ 1.58.
SUBADDITIVE VALUATIONS
Here we show a lower bound of 2 on the mixed PoA when players have subadditive valuations. This lower bound matches the upper bound by Feldman et al. [2013] . PROOF. Consider two players and m items with the following valuations: player 1 is a unit-demand player with valuation v < 1 (to be determined later) if she gets at least one item, and player 2 has valuation 1 for getting at least one but less than m items and valuation 2 if she gets all of the items. Inspired by Hassidim et al. [2011] , we use the following distribution functions:
Player 1 picks one of the m items uniformly at random and bids x for this item and 0 for all other items. Player 2 bids y for each of the m items. The bids x and y are drawn from distributions with CDF F(x) and G(y), respectively. In the case of a tie, the item is always allocated to player 2. Let B denote this mixed bidding profile. We are going to prove that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium for every v > 1/m.
If player 1 bids any x in the range (0, 1/m] for the one item, then she gets the item with probability F(x), as a tie appears with zero probability. Her expected utility for
, her utility is v −1/m (note that according to G(x), she bids 0 with zero probability). Bidding something greater than 1/m results in a utility less than v − 1/m. Regarding player 1, it remains to show that her utility while bidding for only one item is at least her utility while bidding for more items. Suppose that player 1 bids
Player 1 doesn't get any item if and only if y ≥ x 1 . Therefore, with probability F(x 1 ), she gets at least one item and pays at least x 1 . Thus, her expected utility is at most F(x 1 )(v − x 1 ) = v − 1/m (but it would be strictly less if she is charged nonzero payments for other items). This means that bidding only x 1 for one item and zero for the rest of them dominates the strategy that we have assumed.
If player 2 bids a common bid y for all items, where y ∈ [0, 1/m], she gets m items with probability G(y) and m − 1 items with probability 1 − G(y). Her expected utility is
We show that player 2 cannot get a utility higher than 1 by using any deviating bids. Suppose now that player 2 bids y i for item i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Player 1 bids for item i (according to G(x)) with probability 1/m. We also use that since G is a CDF, for x > 1/m holds that
Overall, we proved that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that the optimal allocation gives all items to player 2 and has social welfare 2. In the Nash equilibrium B, player 2 bids 0 with probability 1 − 1 mv , so with at least this probability, player 1 gets one item.
, which for large m converges to 2.
ADDITIVE VALUATIONS
For additive valuations, we show that mixed Nash equilibria are efficient whenever they exist. This implies an interesting separation between mixed equilibria with full information and Bayesian equilibria, which are known not to be efficient [Krishna 2002] . For the sake of completeness, we present a lower bound of 1.06 for the Bayesian PoA of single-item auctions in Appendix A.
The Price of Anarchy for Single-Item Auctions is 1
We consider a first-price single-item auction, where the valuations of the players for the item are given by (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ). We show that the PoA in mixed strategies is 1. For any mixed Nash equilibrium of strategies B = (B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B n ), let B i denote the probability measure of the distribution of bid b i ; in particular,
Recall that for a given B, for every bidder i ∈ [n], F i (b i ) denotes the CDF of max j =i b j . We also use ϕ i (b i ) to denote the probability that player i gets the item with bid
be the expected utility of i on the condition that his bid is in I. By definition,
The next lemma follows from the definition of (mixed) Nash equilibria. It states that in equilibrium, the excepted utility of any player i, conditioned on the event b i ∈ I, must be equal to his overall expected utility, given that he bids with positive probability in the interval I. 
, the proof is analogous: in this case, the player would be better off bidding outside the interval. Both cases would contradict B being a Nash equilibrium.
In the next lemma, we show that for any two players with positive utility, the infimum of their bids must be equal, and they both bid higher than this value with probability 1. Intuitively, if a player has nonzero utility, then his lowest possible bid cannot be lower than any player's lowest bid.
LEMMA 5.2. Assume that in a mixed Nash equilibrium B there are bidders i and j, with positive utilities
Then q i = q j = q and G i (q) = G j (q) = 0, and consequently F i (q) = F j (q) = 0.
PROOF. Assume without loss of generality that q i > q j . Note that by the definition of q j , player j bids with positive probability in the interval I = [q j , q i ).
On the other hand, F j (x) = 0 over interval I, since (at least) player i bids higher than x with probability 1. This implies that E[u j |b j ∈ I] = 0. Using Lemma 5.1, we obtain E[u j ] = E[u j |b j ∈ I] = 0, contradicting our assumptions. This proves that q i = q j = q.
Next we show that G i (q) = G j (q) = 0. Observe first that because of E[u j ] > 0, v j > q and v i > q must hold, as q is the smallest possible bid of j and of i. Assume now that G i (q) > 0 and G j (q) = 0. Then P[b i = q] > 0, but E[u i |b i = q] = 0, as j bids higher. This again contradicts Lemma 5.1 for the interval [q, q] .
Second, assume that G i (q) > 0 and G j (q) > 0. In case b i = b j = q, bidder i or bidder j receives the item with probability smaller than 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that it is player i. In this case, bidder i is better off by bidding q + for a small enough instead of bidding q, since in case of bids b i = q + , and b j = q, he gets the item for sure. This contradicts B being a Nash equilibrium, and altogether we conclude that
Finally, this immediately implies that F i (q) = F j (q) = 0, since for both i and j (at least), the other one bids higher than q with probability 1.
Finally, we prove that mixed equilibria are always efficient. We use the preceding lemma to show that all players who have nonzero utility must have maximum valuation.
THEOREM 5.3. In a single-item auction the PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is 1.
PROOF. Let v i be the maximum valuation in the single-item auction with full information. Assume for the sake of contradiction that a mixed Nash equilibrium B has E b∈B [SW(b)] < SW(OPT) = v i . Then there is a nonempty set of bidders J ⊂ [n] \ {i}, who all get the item with positive probability in B, moreover v k < v i holds for all k ∈ J. Let j ∈ J denote the player with maximum valuation v j < v i among players in J.
We show that E[u i ] > 0 and E[u j ] > 0. Let us first consider the distribution F i (x) of the maximum bid in b −i . If F i (v i − δ) = 0 for all δ > 0, then the highest bid in b −i and thus the payment of player j is at least v i > v j whenever j wins the item. Thus, for his utility, E[u j ] < 0, contradicting that B is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there exists a small δ such that F i (v i − δ) > 0. This implies that E[u i ] > 0, because by bidding v i − δ/2 only, player i would have higher than 0 utility. Now assume for the sake of contradiction that E[u j ] = 0 (E[u j ] < 0 is impossible in an equilibrium). Note that F j (v j ) > 0; otherwise, j would get the item with positive probability but always for a price higher than v j . On the other hand, if there were a small δ such that F j (v j − δ ) > 0, then j could improve his 0 utility by bidding v j − δ /2 only. The latter implies that j can get the item (with positive probability) only with bids v j or higher, so he never bids higher so as to avoid negative expected utility. We obtained that ϕ j (v j ) > 0, where ϕ j (v j ) denotes the probability of j winning the item with bid v j .
Moreover, F j (v j − δ ) = 0 for all δ > 0 implies that the minimum bid of at least one player k is at least v j (inf x {G k (x) > 0} ≥ v j ). Therefore the winning bids of player i are also at least v j (both when i = k, and when i = k). But then i could improve his utility by overbidding the (with positive probability) winning bid v j of j-that is, by bidding exactly v j + (instead of ≤ v j + ) with probability G i (v j + ) for a small enough . With this bid, the additional utility of i would get arbitrarily close to (at
Thus, we established the existence of players i and j, with different valuations v j < v i , and both with strictly positive expected utility in B. According to Lemma 5.2, for the infimum of these two players' bids, q i = q j = q and F i (q) = F j (q) = 0 hold. Furthermore, q < v j < v i ; otherwise, the utility of j could not be positive. By the definition of q i = q, for any > 0, it holds that P[q ≤ b i < q + ] > 0. Therefore, by Lemma 5.1, and by the definition of conditional expectation, for the interval I = [q, q + ), we have
Rearranging terms, this yields
as a CDF is right continuous in every point, this positive lower bound must hold for F i (q) as well, contradicting F i (q) = 0.
Upper Bound for Additive Valuations
We extend the preceding proof for additive valuations.
THEOREM 5.4. For simultaneous FPAs with additive valuations, the PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is 1.
PROOF. Let B be a mixed Nash equilibrium in the m item case. We argue first that for any fixed bidder i, it is without loss of generality to assume that in B i his bids for each item are drawn from independent distributions. If this were not the case, we could determine the distribution B j i of b i ( j) for any item to have the same CDF G j i as the distribution of bids for this item in B i . Then we would replace B i by the product distribution for the items B i = ×B j i . Since both the expected valuation and the expected payment for item j would remain the same in this new strategy, and the valuation and utility of the player are the sum of valuations and utilities over the items, none of these amounts would be affected. Furthermore, the same additivity holds for any other player k, whose "price function" F j k (·) for item j would also not be influenced. Thus, with B i replaced by the strategy B i , the mixed profile B = (B i , B −i ) would remain a mixed Nash with the same expected social welfare as B.
The remaining argument is similar. Now the distribution of bids (B j i ) i∈ [n] for any particular item j corresponds to a mixed Nash equilibrium of the single-item auction for this item. Otherwise, a player could improve his utility for j and consequently the sum of his utilities for all items. In turn, by Theorem 5.3, this implies that the social welfare for each item j is optimal, and a player (or players) with maximum valuation receives the item, which concludes the proof.
BID-DEPENDENT AUCTIONS
Here we generalize some of our results to simultaneous bid-dependent auctions. Intuitively, a single-item auction is bid dependent if the winner is always the highest bidder, and a bidder's payment depends only on whether she gets the item or not, and on her own bid. For instance, the FPA and the APA are bid dependent but the SPA is not.
For a given simultaneous bid-dependent auction, we will denote by q w j (x) and q l j (x) a bidder's payment p ij (b) for item j when her bid for j is x, depending on whether she is the winner or a loser, respectively. Note that we assume q w j (x) (respectively, q l j (x)) to be the same for all bidders. Without this assumption, the PoA is unbounded, as we show in Appendix B. To guarantee the existence of reasonable Nash equilibria, we also make the following natural assumptions about q w j (x) and q l j (x): 9 -q w j (x) and q l j (x) are nondecreasing, continuous functions of x and normalized such that q l j (0) = q w j (0) = 0; -q w j (x) ≥ q l j (x) for all x ≥ 0; -q w k (x) > 0 for some x (to avoid the case of all payments being zero, for that no Nash equilibria exist).
Fractionally Subadditive Valuations
6.1.1. Upper Bounds. In this section, we discuss the general upper bound for simultaneous bid-dependent auctions.
We define θ as θ = max j∈ [m] 
. We will prove that (for θ = 1) the coarse-correlated and the Bayesian PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with fractionally subadditive bidders is at most (θ−1) 2 θ 2 −θ+1−e θ −1 . When we set θ = 0 or θ → 1, we get back the upper bounds of e/(e−1) for FPAs and 2 for APAs, respectively.
We start by proving a lemma for a single item, analogous to Lemma 3.3.
LEMMA 6.1. Consider a single-item bid-dependent auction with payment functions q w (x) and q l (x). Let B be an arbitrary randomized bidding profile, and F i denote the CDF of the random variable max k =i b k , for this B. Then for every bidder i, and nonnegative value v, there exists a pure bidding strategy a = a(v,
is the expected payment from player k.
PROOF. Let a = arg max x {F i (x)(v − q w (x) + q l (x)) − q l (x)} and A = F i (a)(v − q w (a) + q l (a)) − q l (a). In the following, we use that F i is the CDF of max k =i b k , and since q w (·) is continuous,
The second inequality follows from the definition of A and a, and the third one is due to the fact that q l j (x) ≤ θ · q w j (x) for any x. For the last one, q w (0) = 0 and we further need to show that for
The lemma follows by replacing A with this value.
In the following, let f S i (·) be a maximizing additive function of set S for player i with fractionally subadditive valuation function v i . By the definition of fractionally subadditive valuations, we have that v i (T ) ≥ f S i (T ) for every T ⊆ S and f S i (S) = v i (S). LEMMA 6.2. For any set S of items, and any strategy profile b, where b ij = 0 for j / ∈ S,
PROOF.
LEMMA 6.3. Let B be a coarse-correlated equilibrium of a simultaneous bid-dependent auction. For any set of items S and any pure strategy b i of player i, where b ij = 0 for j / ∈ S,
The proof of the lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3.2: Lemma 6.1, for every fixed player i and item j, there exists a bid a ij such that
For player i, we consider the deviation that her bid is a ij for every item in O i (and 0 for all other items) and apply Lemma 6.3. Combined with the preceding inequality (for all items in O i ), we obtain
By summing over all players, we get
Similarly to Lemmas 3.2 and 6.3, we can prove the following.
LEMMA 6.5. Assume that B be is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and let S be an arbitrary set of items. For player i with valuation v i , let b i be a pure strategy such that b ij = 0 for j / ∈ S. Then
THEOREM 6.6. The Bayesian PoA of any bid-dependent auction, when the bidders have fractionally subadditive and independently distributed valuations, is at most (θ−1) 2 θ 2 −θ+1−e θ −1 .
Suppose that B is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the valuation of each player i is drawn according to v i ∼ D i , where the D i are independently distributed. We use the notation C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ) to denote the bidding distribution in B that involves the randomness of the valuations v, and of the bidding strategy
It should be noted that C −i does not depend on a particular v −i (just on the distribution D). In addition,notice that the following equality holds:
. 10 For any player i and any fractionally subadditive valuation v i ∈ V i , consider the following deviation: consider some v −i ∼ D −i , then for every j ∈ O(v i , v −i ), bid a j (v i , C −i ) as defined in Lemma 6.1. By applying Lemma 6.5 for over v i and v −i and summing over all players, we have that
The last inequality follows by Lemma 6.1.
6.1.2. Lower Bound. Here we present a lower bound of e e−1 for the PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with OXS valuations and for mixed equilibria. This implies a lower bound for submodular and fractionally subadditive valuations, as well as for more general classes of equilibria. THEOREM 6.7. The PoA of simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with full information and OXS valuations is at least e e−1 ≈ 1.58. PROOF. The proof is very similar to the one for simultaneous FPAs (Section 3.2). Therefore, we only point out the differences. The same construction applies here; the only difference appears in the Nash strategy profile and in a scaling of the valuations.
We choose an appropriate value V such that V (1 − ( n−1 n ) n−1 ) is in the range of q w j (·) for all j (notice that due to our assumptions on q w j , there exists such a V ). We consider the same set of players and items as in Section 3.2; the valuation functions of the players are the same as in Section 3.2, except that each valuation is multiplied by V. Additionally, the same tie-breaking rule applies.
As for the mixed Nash equilibrium B, the dummy player still bids 0 for every item and every real player still picks an n − 1-dimensional slice in the same random way. However, the bid x j that she bids for every item j of that slice is drawn according to a distribution with the following item-specific CDF (we will show next that G j is a valid CDF):
where T j is the bidsuch that q w j (T j ) = V (1 − ( n−1 n ) n−1 ). Notice that we can no longer require that the bids of a player on different items are equal, as the CDFs G j are different. Instead, we require that for every real player, the bids x j for different items in her slice are correlated in the following way: she chooses ρ uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1] and then sets x j = G −1 j (ρ) for every j in her slice. Note that for any two items j 1 , j 2 of the slice, it holds that G j 1 (x 1 ) = G j 2 (x 2 ) = ρ and x j 1 is not necessarily equal to x j 2 . However, for each item j in the slice, the way that x j is chosen is equivalent to sampling it according to the CDF G j (x j ) (but in a correlated way to the other bids). The fact that each player's bids are such that the CDF values become equal will be sufficient for proving that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
The probability F j (x) that a player gets item j if she bids x for it is as such:
Recall that the valuation of player i is additive, restricted to the slice of items that she bids for in a particular b i . Therefore, the expected utility of i when he bids
PROOF. First, we fix an arbitrary w −i ∈ [n] n−1 , then focus on the set of items C := {( , w −i ) | ∈ [n]}, which we call a column for player i. Recall that i is interested in getting only one item within C; on the other hand, his valuation is additive over items from different columns. Moreover, in a fixed b −i , every other player k submits bids x j , resulting in equal values of G j (x j ) for all items in C, because either the whole C is in the current slice of k and he bids correlated bids on them, or no item from the column is in the slice and he bids 0.
Consider first a deviating bid, in which i bids a positive value for more than one items in C, say (at least) the values x 1 , x 2 > 0 for items j 1 , j 2 , respectively, and without loss of generality assume that G j 1 (x 1 ) is maximum over items in C. We prove that if she loses item j 1 , she should lose item j 2 as well: if she loses j 1 , then there must be a bidder k with bid x 1 > x 1 for item j 1 . Since G j 1 (x) is increasing, this implies G j 1 (x 1 ) > G j 1 (x 1 ). However, since the bids of player k are correlated (and j 2 is in his slice as well), for his bid x 2 on j 2 , it holds that G j 2 (x 2 ) = G j 1 (x 1 ) > G j 1 (x 1 ) ≥ G j 2 (x 2 ). Therefore, x 2 > x 2 , so player i cannot win item j 2 either, so bidding for item j 2 cannot contribute to the valuation, whereas the bidder might pay for more items than j 1 . Consequently, bidding for only one item in C and 0 for the rest of C is more profitable.
Second, observe that restricted to a fixed column, submitting any bid x ∈ [0, T j ] for one arbitrary item j results in the constant expected utility of V ( n−1 n ) n−1 , whereas by bidding higher than T j , the utility would be at most V − q w j (T j ) = V ( n−1 n ) n−1 for this column. In summary, bidding for exactly one item j from each column, an arbitrary bid x ∈ [0, T j ] is a best response for i yielding the preceding expected utility, which concludes the proof that B is a Nash equilibrium.
The rest of the argument is exactly the same as in the proof for FPAs, with both SW(B) and SW(O) scaled by V, which cancels out in the PoA.
It remains to prove that the G j (·) are valid CDFs for every j. To this end, it is sufficient to show that G j (T j ) = 1 and that G j (x) is nondecreasing in [0, T j ]. For simplicity, we skip index j.
The last two inequalities follow from the monotonicity of q l and q w , and from the fact that V (1 − ( n−1 n ) n−1 ) ≥ q w (x 1 ) holds by the definition of T j .
Subadditive Valuations
We prove tight bounds for the PoA in simultaneous bid-dependent auctions with subadditive bidder valuations. We show that the coarse-correlated and the Bayesian PoA is exactly 2. Our results hold even for a class of auctions more general than bid-dependent auctions: we allow the payment rule to depend on the rank of the bid, where the r th highest bid (with an arbitrary tie-breaking rule) has rank r. We use q j (x, r) to denote the payment that the bidder should pay for item j when her bid is x and gets rank r. In particular, given a mixed bidding strategy B, bidder i's expected payment p i (B) is equal
. Note that q w j (x) from the previous section is q j (x, 1) here, and q l j (x) can be different for different ranks. Analogous assumptions to the ones made on q w j (x) and q l j (x) can be made on q j (x, r) as well. For the following upper bound, we only assume that the q j (., r) are normalized and increasing, and that q j (x, 1) ≥ q j (x, r).
Upper Bounds.
LEMMA 6.9. For any simultaneous bid-dependent auction, subadditive valuation profile v, and randomized bidding profile B, there exists a randomized bid vector A i (v, B −i ) for each player i such that for the total expected utility and expected payments of the bidders,
holds, where O v i is the optimal set of player i.
PROOF. Under the profile v, O v i is the set of items allocated to player i in the optimum. We denote by h j (b) = arg max i b ij the bidder with the highest bid for item j, regarding the pure bidding b. Let t ij be the maximum of bids for item j among players other than i, and let t i be the vector such that its j th coordinate equals t ij if j ∈ O v i and 0 otherwise. Note that t i ∼ T i is an induced random variable of B −i . We define the randomized bid A i (v, B −i ) to follow the same distribution T i (inspired by Feldman et al. [2013] ).
We use the notation v i (b i , t i ) and W i (b i , t i ) to denote player i's valuation and winning set when she bids b i and the prices are t i -that is, v i (S) and W i (S), where S = { j|b ij ≥ t ij }.
, 1), we use that q j (., 1) is nondecreasing, and the fact that
, for computing the maximum, we also consider player i. For the last inequality, notice that
as from the sum of all payments for item j, we subtracted the payment of the winner. The lemma follows by summing over all players. THEOREM 6.10. For bidders with subadditive valuations, the coarse-correlated PoA of any bid-dependent auction is at most 2.
PROOF. Suppose that B is a coarse-correlated equilibrium (notice that v is fixed). By Lemma 6.9 and the definition of coarse-correlated equilibrium, we have
By rearranging the terms, SW(B) = i u i (B) + i j p ij (B) ≥ 1/2 · SW(O).
PROOF. We consider two players and m items. Let v and V (with v < V ) be positive reals to be defined later. Player 1 has value v for every nonempty subset of items; player 2 values with V any nonempty strict subset of the items and with 2V the whole set of items. Consider now the mixed strategy profile B, where player 1 picks item l uniformly at random and bids x l for it and 0 for the rest of the items, whereas player 2 bids y j for every item j. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, x j and y j are drawn from distributions with the following CDFs G j (x) and F j (y), respectively:
where T j is the bid such that q w j (T j ) = V /m. We choose V such that V /m is in the range of q w j (·) for all j (notice that due to the assumptions on q w j , there always exists such a value V ). Furthermore, in B, the y j 's are correlated in the following way: player 2 chooses ρ uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1], and if ρ ∈ [0, v−V /m v ), then y j = 0, otherwise y j = F −1 j (ρ), for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m. 11 Note that for every two items j 1 , j 2 , it holds that F j 1 (y j 1 ) = F j 2 (y j 2 ). In case of a tie, player 2 gets the item. Due to the continuity of q w j and q l j , G j (x) and F j (x) are continuous, and therefore none of the CDF has a mass point in any x = 0.
We show below that B is a Nash equilibrium, and each of the F j and G j are valid cumulative distributions. The PoA can then be derived as follows. Player 2 bids 0 with
, which, for large m converges to 2. CLAIM 6.13. B is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. If player 1 bids any x in the range of (0, T j ] for a single-item j and zero for the rest, her utility is
Since G(0) = 0, her utility is also v − V /m if she bids according to G(·). Suppose that player 1 bids x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), (x j ∈ [0, T j ]) with at least two positive bids. Without loss of generality, assume that F 1 (x 1 ) = max i F i (x i ). If y 1 ≥ x 1 , player 1 does not get any item, as for every j, F j (y j ) = F 1 (y 1 ) ≥ F 1 (x 1 ) ≥ F j (x j ) and so y j ≥ x j (recall that in any tie, player 2 gets the item). If y 1 < x 1 , player 1 gets at least the first item and has valuation v, but she cannot pay less than q w 1 (x 1 ). Thus, this strategy is dominated by the strategy of bidding x 1 for the first item and zero for the rest. Bidding x j > T j for any item guarantees the item but results in a utility less than
so it is dominated by the strategy of bidding exactly T j for this item.
If player 2 bids (y 1 , . . . , y m ) for every item j so that y j ∈ [0, T j ], then (since player 1 bids positive for any particular item j with probablility 1/m) her expected utility is
Bidding greater than T j for any item is dominated by the strategy of bidding exactly T j for this item. Overall, B is Nash equilibrium. CLAIM 6.14. G j (·) and F j (·) are valid cumulative distributions.
PROOF. It is sufficient to show that for every j, G j (T j ) = F j (T j ) = 1 and G j (x) and F j (x) are nondecreasing in [0, T j ]. In the following, we skip index j:
For both inequalities, we use the monotonicity of q, moreover that q w
DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS
Discriminatory auctions are multiunit auctions-that is, m units of the same item are sold to n bidders. We denote the valuation of player i for j units of the item by v i ( j). The valuation v i is submodular if the items have decreasing marginal values-in other words, v
We assume a standard multiunit auction in which each player submits a vector b i of m decreasing bids b i (1) ≥ b i (2) ≥ · · · ≥ b i (m) ≥ 0. The bidding profile of all players is then b = (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ). In the allocation ξ (b) = (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . , ξ n ), bidder i gets ξ i units of the item, if ξ i of his bids were among the m highest bids of the players. In the case of discriminatory pricing, every bidder i pays the sum of his winning bids-that is, his ξ i highest bids.
In this section, we complement the results by de Keijzer et al. [2013] for the case of subadditive valuations by providing a matching lower bound of 2 for the standard bidding format. For the case of submodular valuations, we provide a lower bound of 1.109. We could reprove their upper bound of e/(e − 1) for submodular bids using our nonsmooth approach. Due to the different nature of this auction, the proof is not identical with the one for the FPA. Therefore, we present the complete proof of this upper bound.
Preliminaries
The social welfare of the allocation ξ
The players have quasilinear utility functions:
Similarly to item bidding auctions, having a mixed strategyB i means that b i is drawn from the set of all possible decreasing bid vectors according to the distribution B i , which we denote by b i ∼ B i . Given a valuation profile v of the players, an optimal allocation
. Consider a discriminatory auction with submodular valuations, with n players and m items. Recall that v i ( j) denotes the valuation of player i for j copies of the item. For any player i, we define v ij = v i ( j) j . It is easy to see that for submodular functions, v ij ≥ v i( j+1) for all j ∈ [m − 1]. Let β j (b) be the j th lowest bid among the winning bids under the strategy profile b. Consider any randomized bidding profile B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ). For this B, β j (b) is a random variable depending on b ∼ B. We define the following functions:
We further define F av (x) and let β av i be a random variable with F av i (x) as CDF. F av i (x) is a CDF defined on R + , since F av i (0) = 0, lim x→+∞ (F av i (x)) = 1 and F av i (x) is the average of nondecreasing functions, so it is itself a nondecreasing function. Moreover,
Note that the preceding functions depend on some randomized bidding profile B −i and on v. These will be clear from context when we use these functions next.
Upper Bound for Submodular Valuations
LEMMA 7.1. For any submodular valuation profile v and any randomized bidding profile B, there exists a pure bidding strategy a i (v, B −i ) for each player i such that
) be the selected strategy profile for player i. Observe that by the definition of G ij (),G ij (a i ) is the probability of a i being the j th lowest bid among winning bids under B −i . Therefore, if player i bids according to a i (v, B − 
For the second inequality, v ij ≥ v io i for submodular valuations and for the following equality, we used (3) where m is set to o v i . For the last inequality, we apply Lemma 3.3, since a i maximizes the expression (v io v i − a i )F av i (a i ). For any pure strategy profile b and any valuation profile v, it holds that
By summing up over all players and using this inequality, the lemma follows. PROOF. Suppose that B is a coarse-correlated equilibrium (in this case, v is fixed). By Lemma 7.1 and the definition of coarse-correlated equilibrium, we have that
After rearranging the terms, SW(B) = i u i (B) + j β j (B) ≥ (1 − 1 e )SW(o).
THEOREM 7.3. The BPoA of the discriminatory auction is at most e e−1 when the players' valuations are submodular.
PROOF. Suppose that B is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the valuation of each player i is v i ∼ D i , where the D i 's are independent distributions. We denote by C = (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C n ) the bidding distribution in B that includes the randomness of both the bidding strategy b and of the valuations v-that is, b i (v i ) ∼ C i . Then the utility of agent i with valuation v i can be expressed by u i (B i (v i ), C −i ). It should be noted that C −i depends on D −i but not on the v −i . For any agent i and any submodular valuation v i ∈ V i , consider the following deviation: sample v −i ∼ D −i and bid a i ((v i , v −i ), C −i ) as defined in Lemma 7.1. By the definition of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we have
By taking expectation over v i and summing up over all agents,
Lower Bounds
7.3.1. Submodular Valuations.
THEOREM 7.4. The PoA for submodular discriminatory auctions is at least 1.099.
PROOF. We present an example for a discriminatory auction with submodular valuations and show that the PoA of mixed Nash equilibria is at least 1.099.
We design a game with two players and two identical items. Player 1 has valuation (v, v) (i.e., her valuation is v if she gets one or two items), whereas player 2 has valuation (1, 2) (i.e., he is additive with value 1 for each item). We use the following distribution functions defined by Hassidim et al. [2011] :
Consider the following mixed strategy profile. Player 1 bids (x, 0) and player 2 bids (y, y), where x and y are drawn from G(x) and F(y), respectively. Noting that player 2 bids 0 with probability F(0) = 1 − 1/2v, we need a tie-breaking rule for the case of bidding 0, in which player 2 always gets the item. We claim that this mixed strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
We first prove that playing (x, 0) for player 1 is a best response for every x ∈ [0, 1/2]. Notice that (x, x ) with x ≤ x is dominated by (x, 0), since if player 1 gets at least one item, she should pay at least x, and getting both items does not add to her utility:
Clearly, bidding higher than 1/2 guarantees the item, but the payment is higher. Now we need to show that (y, y) is a best response for player 2 for every y ∈ [0, 1/2]. Consider any strategy (y, y ) with y, y ∈ [0, 1/2] and y ≥ y : and u 2 (y, y) = 1 is maximum possible. Bidding strictly higher than 1/2 for both items is not profitable, since then her utility is 2 − 2y < 1. Now we calculate the expected social welfare of this Nash equilibrium.
This expression is maximized for v = 0.643. For this value of v, E[SW] = 1.818. Since SW(O) = 2, we get PoA = 1.099. 12 7.3.2. Subadditive Valuations. We provide a tight lower bound of 2 for subadditive valuations in discriminatory auctions that is similar to the lower bound of Section 4, adjusted to discriminatory auctions. THEOREM 7.5. For discriminatory auctions, the PoA in mixed Nash equilibria is at least 2 for bidders with subadditive valuations.
PROOF. Consider two players and m items with the following valuations: player 1 is a unit-demand player with valuation v < 1 if she gets at least one item; player 2 has valuation 1 for getting less than m but at least one items and valuation 2 if she gets all of the items. Inspired by Hassidim et al. [2011] , we use the following distribution functions:
Player 1 bids b 1 = (x, 0, . . . , 0), and player 2 bids b 2 = (y, . . . , y). x and y are drawn from G(x) and F(y), respectively. In case of a tie, the item is always allocated to player 2.
Let B = (B 1 , B 2 ) denote this mixed bidding profile. We are going to prove that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium for every v > 1/m.
If player 1 bids any x in the range (0, 1/m] for one item, she gets the item with probability F(x), since a tie occurs with zero probability. Her expected utility is F(x)(v − x) = v − 1/m. Thus, for every x ∈ (0, 1/m], her utility is v − 1/m. If player 1 picks x according to G(x), her utility is still v − 1/m, since she bids 0 with zero probability. Bidding something greater than 1/m results in a utility less than v − 1/m. Regarding player 1, it remains to show that her utility when bidding for only one item is at least as high as her utility when bidding for more items. Suppose that player 1 bids (x 1 , . . . , x m ), where x i ≥ x i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. Player 1 does not get any item if and only if y ≥ x 1 . So, with probability F(x 1 ), she gets at least one item and pays at least x 1 . Therefore, her expected utility is at most F(x 1 )(v − x 1 ) = v − 1/m, but it would be strictly less if she had nonzero payments for other items with positive probability. This means that bidding only x 1 for one item and zero for the rest of them dominates the strategy (x 1 , . . . , x m ).
If player 2 bids y for all items, where y ∈ [0, 1/m], she gets m items with probability G(y) and m − 1 items with probability 1 − G(y). Her expected utility is G(y)(2 − my) + (1 − G(y))(1 − (m− 1)y) = G(y)(1 − y) + 1 − (m− 1)y = 1. Bidding something greater than 1/m results in utility less than 1. Suppose now that player 2 bids (y 1 , . . . , y m ), where y i ≥ y i+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1. If x ≤ y m , player 2 gets all of the items; otherwise, she gets m − 1 items and pays her m − 1 highest bids. Thus, her utility is
Overall, we proved that B is a mixed Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that the social welfare in the optimum allocation is 2. In this Nash equilibrium, player 2 bids 0 with probability 1 − 1 mv , so with at least this probability, player 1 gets one item.
SW(B)
APPENDIXES

A. A LOWER BOUND EXAMPLE FOR THE SINGLE-ITEM BAYESIAN PRICE OF ANARCHY
Bayesian equilibria were known to be inefficient [Krishna 2002 ]. Here, for the sake of completeness, we present a lower bound example for the BPoA, with two players and only one item. THEOREM A.1. For single-item auctions, the PoA in Bayesian Nash equilibria is at least 1.06.
PROOF. In the lower bound instance, we have two bidders and only one item. The valuation of bidder 1 is always 1. Let l = 1 − 2/e and r = 1 − 1/e. The valuation of bidder 2 is distributed according to the CDF H: 
